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THE UNITARINESS DILEMMA: THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S
ATYEMPT TO DEVELOP A TEST FOR
DETERMINING WHEN A SYSTEM
IS UNITARY
In Brown v. Board of Education (Brown I), 1 the Supreme Court pro-
claimed that the doctrine of "separate but equal"2 has no place in public
education. The Court found that separate educational facilities are in-
herently unequal3 and deny minority children equal protection of the
1. 347 U.S. 483 (1954). In Brown I the Supreme Court consolidated cases from four different
school systems: Topeka, Kansas (Brown v. Board of Education); Clearendon County, South Caro-
lina (Briggs v. Elliott); Prince Edward County, Virginia (Davis v. County School Board); and New
Castle County, Delaware (Gebhart v. Belton). In a separate case, Boiling v. Sharpe, the Court also
held that the District of Columbia was segregated. 347 U.S. 497, 500 (1954).
For a fascinating account of the history of the Brown litigation, and of the struggles of blacks to
achieve school desegregation, see R. KLUGER, SIMPLE JUSTICE: THE HISTORY OF BROWN V.
BOARD OF EDUCATION AND BLACK AMERICA'S STRUGGLE FOR EQUALITY (1976).
2. The Court adopted the doctrine of "separate but equal" in Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537
(1896). In Plessy, the Court affirmed the conviction of a person of mixed race who violated Louisi-
ana law by refusing to leave his railroad seat in a car reserved for whites. The Court found such
segregation compatible with the "equal protection clause" of the fourteenth amendment. Specifi-
cally, the court opined:
The object of the amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the absolute equality of the two
races before the law, but in the nature of things it could not have been intended to abolish
distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social, as distinguished from political equality,
or a commingling of the two races upon terms unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting,
and even requiring, their separation in places where they are liable to be brought into
contact do not necessarily imply the inferiority of either race to the other, and have been
generally, if not universally, recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in
the exercise of their power. The most common instance of this is connected with the estab-
lishment of separate schools for whites and colored children, which has been held to be a
valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political rights of
the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced.
Id. at 544.
Despite the Court's approving language of "separate but equal" facilities in public education, the
Court soon realized that the doctrine would not always ensure equality of education. Gradually, the
Court chipped away at the doctrine, beginning in the area of graduate and professional education.
See Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U.S. 337 (1938) (holding Missouri had an obligation to
admit a black student to the University of Missouri Law School if it could not offer him substantially
equal facilities inside the state); Sipuel v. Oklahoma, 332 U.S. 631 (1948) (reaffirming Gaines);
Sweatt v. Painter, 339 U.S. 629 (1950) (finding inequality between an "ersatz" law school set up
exclusively for blacks and the prestigious University of Texas Law School); McLaurin v. Oklahoma
State Regents, 339 U.S. 637 (1950) (prohibiting segregation of black student from other students
within the same law school).
3. Brown 1, 347 U.S. at 495.
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laws.4 In Brown II the Court placed the primary duty of providing rem-
edy for school segregation on the school boards.6 However, the Court
suggested that district courts use their broad equitable powers to fashion
relief if the school boards failed in their duty.7 The Court required each
board of a segregated school system to make a "prompt and reasonable
start" toward full compliance with Brown 1.8 Moreover, once a school
board begins implementation, then the Court would only allow addi-
tional implementation time consistent with the public interest and good
faith compliance at the earliest practicable date.9 During this interim
period, the district court would retain jurisdiction over the case.1
Thus, from 1954 to 1968, the Supreme Court left primary enforcement
of Brown I to the lower courts and the political process." Only rarely
did the Court step in to firmly reestablish the principles of Brown I, de-
spite the massive resistance to desegregation in the South. 2 It was not
4. Id. The equal protection clause provides: "No State shall.., deny to any person within its
jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws." U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1.
5. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 294 (1955). While the decision in Brown I is a
general ruling as to the constitutional validity of school segregation, Brown II is a remedial decision
limited to the facts of the five consolidated cases. See G. GUNTHER, CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 635,
641 (11th ed. 1985). The Court determined that the remedy for future desegregation cases would be
decided on a case-by-case basis. 349 U.S. at 301.
6. 349 U.S. at 299.
7. 349 U.S. at 300. The district courts would "have to consider whether the action of school
officials constituted good faith implementation of the governing constitutional principles." Id. at
299. If not, the courts would intervene to protect the plaintiffs' interest in admission to public school
on a nondiscriminatory basis. Id.
8. Id.
9. Id. at 300-01. In determining whether a school board needs more implementation time, the
Supreme Court stated that the supervising court:
may consider problems related to administration, arising from the physical condition of the
school plant, the school transportation system, personnel, revision of school districts and
attendance areas into compact units to achieve a system of determining admission to the
public schools on a nonracial basis, and revision of local laws and regulations which may
be necessary in solving the foregoing problems. They will also consider the adequacy of
any plans the defendants may propose to meet these problems and to effectuate a transition
to a racially nondiscriminatory school system.
Id. at 301.
10. Id. at 301.
11. See GUNTHER, supra note 5, at 712-13.
12. But see Cooper v. Aaron, 358 U.S. 1 (1958) (reprimanding the Little Rock, Arkansas school
board and Governor Faubus for refusing to follow the edict of Brown 1); Griffin v. County School
Board of Prince Edward County, 377 U.S. 218 (1964) (prohibiting a state from closing the public
schools to avoid its duties under Brown 1); Goss v. Board of Education, 373 U.S. 683 (1963) (striking
down a transfer plan because it tended to perpetuate racial segregation).
For a general discussion of the post-Brown problems, see Kurland, Brown v. Board of Education
Was the Beginning: The School Desegregation Cases in the United States Supreme Court, 1954-1979,
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until Green v. County School Board 13 that the Supreme Court clarified a
school board's duty to eliminate segregation. Specifically, the Court
found that a "freedom of choice" plan,14 in which students can decide
whether to attend a white school or a black school, is inconsistent with
the requirements of Brown I and Brown 11.15 The Court found that the
ultimate end of desegregation is the transformation of a segregated
school system into a "unitary" non-racial system. 6 To satisfy the
"unitariness" requirement, a school board must initiate a plan with a
realistic expectation of immediate success.1 7
Since Green, the Court has elaborated further the duties of the school
board and the district courts in implementing the Brown 11 edit of a
"prompt and reasonable start" towards unitariness 1 8  However, the
Court has failed to elaborate the elements of a unitary system,19 despite
the fact that defining unitariness is the "central riddle" of school desegre-
1979 WASH. U.L.Q. 309, 324-336; Read, Judicial Evolution of the Law of School Integration Since
Brown v. Board of Education, 39 LAW AND CONTEMP. PROBs. 7 (1975); D. BELL, RACE, RACISM
AND AMERICAN LAW (2d ed. 1980).
13. 391 U.S. 430 (1968).
14. Prior to adoption of this plan, the school board operated two segregated schools: New
Kent (entirely white); and George W. Watkins (entirely black). Although the Virginia consitutional
and statutory provisions mandating segregation in public schools were held unconstitutional in Da-
vis v. County School Board of Prince Edward County, decided with Brown I, the school board
continued the segregated operation of the system after the Brown decisions, presumably on authority
of several statutes enacted by Virginia in resistance to those decisions. 391 U.S. at 433.
15. 391 U.S. at 441-42. Fearing the loss of federal financial aid, the school board adopted the
freedom of choice plan. Id. at 433-34, 433 n.2. During the plan's three years of operation, no white
student chose to attend the all black school. As for the black students, 115 enrolled in the formerly
all-white school. However, 85 % of the black students still attended all black schools. Id.
16. More specifically, the Supreme Court stated: "School boards such as the respondent then
operating state-compelled dual systems were nevertheless clearly charged with the affirmative duty
to take whatever steps might be necessary to convert to a unitary system in which racial discrimina-
tion would be eliminated root and branch." 391 U.S. at 438.
17. 391 U.S. at 439. The Supreme Court did not hold, however, that "freedom of choice" plans
are per se unconstitutional. If the freedom of choice plan offers the promise of effective conversion
into a unitary system, it might be used. However, if, as in Green, other means promise speedier,
more effective conversion to a unitary school system, "freedom of choice" plans must be held uncon-
stitutional. Id. at 441. In Green the Court found that zoning would have provided a more effective
way to dismantle the dual system. Id.
18. See infra notes 27-32 and accompanying text. See also Alexander v. Holmes County Board
of Education, 396 U.S. 19, 20 (1969) (every school district is obligated to terminate dual systems at
once and operate only unitary schools).
19. As used throughout this Note "unitary" describes a school system, "within which no per-
son is to be effectively excluded from any schools because of race or color." Alexander, 396 U.S. at
20. The Supreme Court has consistently held that a unitary system is the goal of a school desegrega-
tion remedy. Id.; Green, 391 U.S. at 436. At the opposite extreme is a "dual system," which the
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gation law.2" This Note addresses the First Circuit's attempt to enunci-
ate the elements a district court should use in determining if a school
system is unitary.21 Part I discusses the effects of a finding of unitariness.
Part II analyzes the three-prong test developed by the First Circuit in
Morgan v. Nucci and that court's application of its test to the Boston
school system. Part III examines the usefulness of the First Circuit's test
by applying it to two other school systems previously declared unitary.
Finally, Part IV contains observations as to the usefulness of the First
Circuit test and recommendations for a modified test of unitariness.
I. EFFECTS OF A FINDING OF UNITARINESS
In a school desegregation case, once a plaintiff has made a prima facie
showing of intentional segregation and maintenance of a dual system, the
duty of remediation of segregation rests with the school board.22 The
school board has a "heavy burden"23 of showing that school board ac-
tions tending to continue the dual system serve "important and legiti-
mate ends."24
A second result of a finding of a dual system is that the district court
obtains jurisdiction over the system and retains it until the court declares
the system unitary.25 The remedial measures that the district court may
Supreme Court has defined as one in which the State, acting through the local school board an
school officials, "enforces a system that is part white and part black." Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
Moreover, the Court has identified segregation of students, faculty, staff, transportation, extracur-
ricular activities and facilities as indicia of a dual system. Green, 391 U.S. at 435.
20. Fiss, The Charlotte-Mecklenburg Case-Its Significance for Northern School Desegregation,
38 U. CHI. L. REv. 697, (1971). See also Gewirtz, Choice in the Transition. School Desegregation
and the Corrective Ideal, 86 COLUM. L. REv. 728, 792 ("the central termination question ... is what
it means to accomplish desegregation and achieve unitary status"). One law review article notes that
the reason why
[t]he Court has refrained from offering such a statement [is] because it has recognized that
no single inflexible formula could apply to all school systems. Just as the methods for
desegregating dual school systems necessarily vary with the circumstances so does the de-
termination whether desegregation has been successful. Courts supervising the desegrega-
tion of dual school systems must define unitariness in light of the circumstances before
them. Once all the vestiges of the dual system, as well as the effects of those vestiges, have
been eliminated, declaring the system unitary is within the discretion of the district court
judge.
Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litiga-
tion, 100 HARV. L. REV. 653, 662-63 (1987) (footnotes omitted).
21. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987).
22. Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 249, 299 (1955).
23. Green v. County School Board, 341 U.S. 430, 439 (1968).
24. Wright v. Council of Emporia, 407 U.S. 451, 459-62, 467 (1972).
25. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 301.
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/7
19881 THE UNITARINESS DILEMMA
take are broad.26 In Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion 27 the Supreme Court sanctioned the district court's use of racial
quotas,28 remedial alteration of school attendance zones,29 and busing of
school children to remedy intentional segregation.30 However, the Court
recognized that these measures were temporary in nature, designed for
use only until the school system achieved unitary status. 31  The Court
failed to specify the elements of unitariness. It did, however, refer in
passing to the effects of a finding of unitariness.3 2
26. Brown II, 349 U.S. at 300 ("In fashioning and effectuating the decrees, the courts will be
guided by equitable principles."). See also Swann v. Charlotte-Meclenburg Board of Education,
402 U.S. 1, 15 (1971) ("Once a right and a violation have been shown the scope of a district court's
equitable powers to remedy past wrongs is broad ... ").
In Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 281 (1977), the Court provided three equitable principles to
guide courts in drafting a remedy. First, the remedy must take into account the nature and scope of
the violation. Second, the remedy should restore the students, to the greatest degree possible, to the
position they would have occupied absent the violation. Finally, the courts should take into consid-
eration the interests of state and local authorities in managing their own affairs in accordance with
the Constitution. Id. at 280-81. The tension between effective remediation and local autonomy has
caused the greatest consternation for lower courts attempting to determine whether a system is uni-
tary and what effects such a finding should have.
27. 402 U.S. 1 (1971).
28. Id. at 22-25. The Court noted that desegregation does not mean every school in the com-
munity must always reflect the racial composition of the system as a whole. However, racial quotas
may be used as a starting point in shaping a remedy. Id.
29. Id. at 27-29. Included in this power is the ability to pair and group noncontiguous zones to
counteract past segregation.
30. Id. at 29-31. The Court recognized that assigning students to the school nearest their home
would not effectively dismantle Charlotte-Mecklenburg's dual system. Busing could therefore be
used to a limited extent. Nonetheless, a valid objection to busing could be made where the time or
distance of travel is so great as to risk either the health of the children or significantly impair the
educational process. One important factor in determining appropriate travel time is the age of the
students. Id. at 31.
31. 402 U.S. at 31-32.
32. The Court observed:
At some point these school authorities and others like them should have achieved full
compliance with this Court's decision in Brown I. The systems would then be "unitary" in
the sense required by our decisions in Green and Alexander. It does not follow that the
communities served by such systems will remain demographically stable, for in a growing,
mobile society, few will do so. Neither school authorities nor district courts are constitu-
tionally required to make year-by-year adjustments of the racial composition of student
bodies once the affirmative duty to desegregate has been accomplished and racial discrimi-
nation through official action is eliminated from the system. This does not mean that fed-
eral courts are without power to deal with future problems; but in the absence of a showing
that either the school authorities or some other agency of the state has deliberately at-
tempted to fix or alter demographic patterns to affect the racial composition of the schools,
further intervention by a district court should not be necessary.
402 U.S. at 31-2.
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A. Returning the System to Local School Board Control
In Pasadena City Board of Education v. Spangler 33 the Supreme Court
first expounded on the effect of a district court finding of unitariness.
Since 1970 the Pasadena school system had operated under a desegrega-
tion plan designed to eliminate schools with "a majority of any minority
students."34 After 1971, however, population shifts undermined the ef-
fectiveness of the plan.35 Thus, in 1974 the school board sought a modifi-
cation of the reassignment order.36 The district court denied the request
and continued the annual reassignment of students, despite the absence
of any proof of deliberate school board efforts to undermine the desegre-
gation efforts.3 7 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the district
court abused its discretion by requiring annual reassignment of students
absent proof that school officials had deliberately caused changes in the
racial mix.38 Furthermore, the Court held that once the Pasadena
School Board accomplished its affirmative duty to desegregate, the dis-
trict court's power to require further annual reassignments terminated.3 9
Thus, once a school system achieves unitary status the school board re-
gains its control over the decision-making process."
33. 427 U.S. 424 (1976).
34. Id. at 431.
35. Id. Following the 1970-71 school year, black enrollment at one Pasadena school exceeded
50 % of the school's total enrollment. The next year, four Pasadena schools had black enrollments
exceeding 50 % of their total enrollment. By the time of the hearing on the school board's motion to
modify the plan, five of Pasadena's thirty-two regular schools were in violation of the district court's
"no majority of any minority" requirement.
36. The Pasadena School Board sought four changes in the original court order: (1) to have the
judgment modified so as to eliminate the requirement that there be no school with a majority of any
minority students, (2) to have the district court's injunction dissolved, (3) to have the district court
terminate its "retained jurisdiction" over the actions of the board and (4) to approve the school
board's modifications of the "Pasadena Plan." Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 375
F. Supp. 1304, 1309-10 (C.D. Cal. 1974).
37. Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 375 F. Supp. 1304 (C.D. Cal. 1974); aff'd
Spangler v. Pasadena City Board of Education, 519 F.2d 430 (9th Cir. 1975). The court of appeals
affirmed two to one but all three judges expressed substantial reservations about some of the district
court's actions, and the implications for future operation of the Pasadena Schools. The majority was
satisfied, however, that the district judge would heed its reservations. 519 F.2d at 440-41 (Cham-
bers, J., concurring). The Supreme Court granted certiorari. 423 U.S. 945 (1975).
38. 427 U.S. at 435.
39. Id. at 436-37. More specifically, the Court stated that: "For having once implemented a
racially neutral attendance pattern in order to remedy the perceived constitutional violations on the
part of the defendants, the District Court [has] fully performed its function of providing the appro-
priate remedy for previous racially discriminatory attendance patterns." Id.
40. According to one commentator, the holding in Pasadena was a narrow one because the trial
judge had taken an "obviously inappropriate" step by "[asserting] the power to maintain a particular
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/7
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Three circuit courts have considered the appropriate role of the district
courts in desegregation cases after a finding of unitariness. In Riddick v.
School Board of City of Norfolk,41 the Fourth Circuit adopted the
Pasadena approach, holding that once a system has achieved unitary sta-
tus the district court may not order further relief to counter resegrega-
tion caused by factors other than the school board's intentional
discrimination.42 Rather, the school system is returned to the school
board and the district court is divested of jurisdiction.43
The Tenth Circuit reached the opposite conclusion in Dowell v. Board
of Education.' In Dowell, the court held that the closing of a school
desegregation case does not diminish the district court's authority after it
had enjoined the board from following segregationist policies.45 The ter-
mination of active supervision over a school system does not prevent the
district court from enforcing its orders.46 Moreover, the mandatory in-
junction remains in effect until the court dissolves it.47 The Tenth Cir-
cuit criticized the Fourth Circuit for "treat[ing] a district court order
terminating supervision as an order dissolving a mandated integration
plan."4 The Dowell court emphasized that a finding of unitariness can-
not divest a court of its jurisdiction, nor can it convert a mandatory in-
junction into voluntary compliance.49
In United States v. Overton50 the Fifth Circuit rejected the Dowell ap-
racial balance in the schools 'in perpetuity', without regard to whether the affirmative duty to deseg-
regate has already been 'accomplished' and a 'unitary system' already achieved." Note, The Unitary
Finding and the Threat of School Resegregation: Riddick v. School Board, 65 N.C.L. REv. 617, 630
n. 112 (1987) (quoting Gewirtz, supra note 20, at 791).
Similarly, the Sixth Circuit narrowly interpreted the Pasadena holding in Oliver v. Kalamazoo
Board of Education, 640 F.2d 782 (6th Cir. 1980). The court reasoned, "Pasadena did not, however,
hold that a district court did not have the authority and duty to order such ancillary programs if
such were found to be necessary to cure the effects on the black children of the prior unconstitutional
school segregation." Id. at 787.
41. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
42. Id. at 537-38.
43. Id. at 537.
44. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
45. Id. at 1520. The court stated that "the viability of a permanent injunction does not depend
upon this ministerial procedure." Id. (citation omitted).
46. Id.
47. Id. at 1520-21. Thus, the court rejected the Fourth Circuit's attempt to treat a district
court order terminating supervision as an order dissolving a mandatory desegregation order, absent a
specific mandate to that effect.
48. Id. at 1520 n.3.
49. Id.
50. 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987).
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proach and adopted the Riddick approach. 1 The Overton court gave
three reasons for its decision. First, the Dowell approach denies meaning
to the concept of unitariness as used by the Supreme Court in Pasadena
and Swann by failing to end judicial superintendence of the school sys-
tem.52 Second, the Dowell approach continues to hold school districts
responsible for resegregation even though the district court declared the
system unitary.53 And finally, the Dowell approach violates the equitable
principle that judicial power "should extend no further than required by
the nature and extent of [the] violation." 54
B. Shifting the Burden of Proof
The second effect of a judicial finding of unitariness is that the burden
of proof5 shifts from the school board to the plaintiff. In order to secure
further judicial intervention, the plaintiff must prove that the school
board acted with the intent to reestablish a dual system.56 Even if the
plaintiff proves a segregative purpose, the school board will prevail if it
demonstrates its actions were based on legitimate, nonsegregative
purposes.57
51. 834 F.2d at 1174-75.
52. Id. at 1175. More specifically the court stated, "Attaining unitary status... means that a
school board is free to act without federal supervision so long as the board does not purposefully
discriminate ......
53. Id. at 1175-76. The court believed a school district is released from the consequences of its
past misdeeds when it eliminates the vestiges of a segregated system and achieves a true unitary
status.
54. Id. at 1176 (citing General Bldg. Contractors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399
(1982)).
55. As used in this Note, "burden of proof" refers to the burden of persuasion, i.e., the burden
of persuading the fact finder "that the disputed fact, in light of all the evidence, is more likely true
than not." Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653 n.1 (1987).
56. See Columbus Board of Education v. Penick, 443 U.S. 449, 464 (1979) (plaintiffs in a deseg-
regation action must "prove not only that segregated schooling exists but also that it was brought
about or maintained by intentional state action." (quoting Keyes v. School District, No. 1, 413 U.S.
189, 198 (1973)).
57. See Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 524, 529 (4th Cir.), cert.
denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986) (upholding a school board plan to limit decreases in white student
population and increase parental involvement). The test of discriminatory purpose derives from two
Supreme Court precedents: Arlington Heights v. Metropolitan Housing Development Corp., 429
U.S. 252 (1977) (approving a zoning ordinance against the challenge that the law had a racially
disproportionate impact), and Washington v. Davis, 426 U.S. 229 (1976) (upholding a written objec-
tive test that had a greater degree of impact on blacks than whites). This test is known as the
"Arlington Heights/Davis test". The test is used when a party challenges that a facially neutral law
has a disproportionate impact. The problem in applying this test is proving a discriminatory pur-
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In Overton v. Austin Independent School District,58 the Fifth Circuit
rejected plaintiff's argument that the burden of proof should remain on
the school board because it had a prior history of discrimination and
superior knowledge of the facts necessary to prove or disprove a discrimi-
natory intent.59 The court found these arguments unpersuasive because
they were based on a view that the school board could never be trusted
and should be kept under federal judicial control indefinitely. The
court recognized the risks involved in giving the school board control
over student assignments and shifting the burden of proof back to the
plaintiff.61 The court, however, believed that school board policy is a
local decision and board members should be relieved of constant court
supervision.62
In Dowell v. Board of Education,63 on the other hand, the Tenth Cir-
cuit refused to shift the burden of proof." Consistent with its finding
that being a unitary system does not mean removal of a mandatory in-
junction,65 the court held that the plaintiff is only required to show that
the school board violated the injunction.66 The burden then shifts to the
pose. Courts are confronted by decision-making entities to whom the judiciary feels it owes some
defereace. Courts are therefore reluctant to look into the motives behind such laws. The Court has
held that the mere impact of the law is not enough to find an equal protection violation. See Person-
nel Administrator of Massachusetts v. Feeney, 442 U.S. 256 (1979) (approving a state law giving
preference to veterans in civil service examinations despite the law's disproportionate impact on
women). The Court refused to base its findings solely on subjective legislative motive. A strict
subjective analysis would overturn many acts approved in a non-discriminatory democratic process
simply because some legislators were prejudiced. J. NOWAK, R. ROTUNDA, J. YOUNG, CONsTrrU-
TIONAL LAW 547 (3rd ed. 1986).
58. 834 F.2d 1171 (5th Cir. 1987).
59. Id. at 1174-75.
60. Id. at 1176.
61. Id. As the court noted, "The carrot of unitariness can be a meaningful incentive for school
districts to desegregate only if we abide by our promise to release federal control when the job is
done."
62. Id. at 1176-77. The court recognized that enforcing the decree once the system is declared
unitary would violate the equitable principle that judicial power should, "extend no further than
required by the nature and extent of [the] violation." Id. at 1176 (quoting, General Bldg. Contrac-
tors Ass'n, Inc. v. Pennsylvania, 458 U.S. 375, 399 (1982)). The constitutional wrong, as the court
states, is the purposeful separation of races in public education. The remedy is to achieve the ap-
proximate mix that would have occurred but for the discrimination. Once that is done the system is
unitary. Once the remedy is complete, refusing to let the school system vary from the desegregation
model unless it proves its nonsegregative purpose confuses the wrong with the remedy. Id. at 1177.
63. 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
64. Id. at 1523.
65. See supra note 47 and accompanying text.
66. 795 F.2d at 1523.
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school board to prove that conditions have changed sufficiently to require
modification or removal of the injunction.67
II. DEFINING THE ELEMENTS OF A UNITARY SYSTEM
Though the Supreme Court has refrained from formally defining the
elements of a unitary school system, 68 it identified the indicia of a dual
system: Segregation among students, faculty and staff; segregation of
transportation; and segregation of extracurricular activities. 69 Yet, the
Court never stated that implementation of a desegregation plan, alone,
makes the school system unitary.7 ° The Court has declined to offer a
single, comprehensive statement defining unitariness because it recog-
nizes that no single, inflexible formula could apply to all systems.7' Just
as the methods for desegregating dual systems necessarily vary with the
circumstances,72 so does the determination of unitariness.73 The Court
67. Id.
For an alternative approach to burden allocation after a finding of unitariness, see Note, Allocating
the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegregation Litigation, 100 HARV. L.
REv. 653, 668-70 (1987), wherein the author proposes that a plaintiff challenging a school board
action as promoting the reestablishment of the dual system after a finding of unitariness must make a
prima facie showing that the action will cause a substantial resegregation of the school system.
Upon this showing, the burden shifts to the school board to prove the action did not result from an
intent to discriminate. If the school authorities are unable to meet this burden, then the challenged
action should be enjoined. See also Note, The Unitariness Finding and Its Effect on Mandatory
Desegregation Injunctions, 55 FORDHAM L. REv. 551, 573-77 (1987).
The Supreme Court has yet to address the issue of burden shifting after a finding of unitariness.
The Court denied certiorari in the Riddick and Dowell cases dealing with burden shifting. 479 U.S.
398 (1986). For criticism of the Court's refusal to hear Riddick and Dowell, see Terez, Protecting the
Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. RES. 41, 41-43 n.7 (1987).
68. See supra note 19 and accompanying text.
69. Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 435 (1968).
70. Rather, the Court consistently maintains that any plan adopted must work effectively. See
Davis v. Board of School Commissioners, 402 U.S. 33, 37 (1971) ("The measure of any desegrega-
tion plan is its effectiveness."); Swann v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 31
(1971) ("desegregation plans must be reasonable, feasible and workable."); Green 391 U.S. at 438-39
(any desegregation plan must "realistically ... work now").
71. See Keyes v. School District No. 1, 413 U.S. 189, 224 n.10 (1973) (Powell, J., concurring in
part and dissenting in part) (recognizing that circumstances and demographics vary from district to
district and thus no hard and fast rules should be formulated).
72. See Note, Allocating the Burden of Proof After a Finding of Unitariness in School Desegrega-
tion Litigation, 100 HARV. L. REv. 653, 663 n.65 (1987) (noting that the Supreme Court recognized
that solutions to segregated schools may vary according to local school problems).
73. See Ross v. Houston Indep. School District, 699 F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) (decision on
whether a system is unitary must be based on the conditions in the district). For this reason, the
determination of unitariness is left to the district courts' discretion. See Swann v. Charlotte-Meck-
lenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1 (1971); Alexander v. Board of Education, 396 U.S. 19
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held that the district court supervising desegregation must define unitari-
ness in light of the circumstances before it.74 But the Court's failure to
provide guidance for the lower courts in determining unitariness has led
to inconsistent results.7" Only the First Circuit, in Morgan v. Nucci,7 6
provides a test for the district courts to apply.
A. History of Boston School Desegregation Litigation
The First Circuit developed its test in Morgan v. Nucci in the context
of the Boston school desegregation litigation. This case ended fifteen
years of continuous litigation centered on desegregation of the Boston
school system.77 Litigation began in 1972 when Morgan brought suit
challenging the segregation in the Boston school system.78 The district
court found that the public schools were suffering from widespread racial
segregation.79 The court attributed this segregation to the purposeful
misconduct of the school board in: (a) assigning students to schools, (b)
discriminating when hiring and placing minority teachers and (c) locat-
ing and upkeeping school buildings.80 In 1975 the district court began
issuing orders to rectify the situation. The most important part of the
desegregation plan dealt with student assignments.81 The district court
fashioned a broad remedy designed to transform the Boston schools into
(1969); Green v. School Board, 391 U.S. 430 (1968); Brown v. Board of Education, 349 U.S. 193
(1955) (Brown I1).
74. See supra note 72.
75. Compare Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
107 S. Ct. 420 with Dowell v. Board of Education, 795 F.2d 1516 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 107 S. Ct.
420 (1986). Without guidance from the Supreme Court, these two circuits reached opposite conclu-
sions on the issues of burden of proof and continued control of the system after a declaration of
unitariness by the district court.
76. 831 F.2d 313 (1st Cir. 1987).
77. For the history of the Boston litigation, see Morgan v. O'Bryant, 671 F.2d 23 (1st Cir.
1982); Morgan v. Kerrigan, 530 F.2d 401 (1st Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935 (1976); Morgan v.
Kerrigan, 509 F.2d 580 (lst Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
78. Morgan v. Hennigan, 379 F. Supp. 410 (D. Mass. 1974), aff'd sub nom., Morgan v. Kerri-
gan, 509 F.2d 580 (1st Cir. 1974), cert. denied, 421 U.S. 963 (1975).
79. 379 F. Supp. at 425.
80. Id. at 449.
81. Morgan v. Kerrigan, 401 F. Supp. 216, 256-57 (D. Mass. 1975), aft'd, 530 F.2d 401 (1st
Cir.), cert. denied, 426 U.S. 935. Under this plan the court divided the city into eight geographical
community districts and one city-wide "magnet" district. The court required assignments to schools
within any one of the community districts to ensure that the percentage of black, white and "other
minority" students approximated the corresponding percentage of each group in that district's total
student population. Id. at 261. Assignments to the magnet schools had to approximate the racial
composition of the student population in the entire city. Id. at 262.
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"a unitary system in which racial discrimination would be eliminated
root and branch." 2
In 1982, the district court found that the Boston school board had
made significant progress toward the goal of unitariness8 3 The court
therefore commenced a transitional program of judicial disengagement. 4
After 1982, for example, the district court permanently terminated half
of its original remedial orders."5 However, the court also issued a series
of instructive "final orders" in certain areas, including student assign-
ments, which it deemed to warrant further judicial control.8 6
The final order for student assignments required that the school board
indefinitely maintain specific racial mixes in the city's schools approxi-
mating the balances mandated by the district court during the "active"
supervision years.8 7 The school board appealed from this order, claiming
that an injunction indefinitely perpetuating a particular, judicially-drawn
82. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 316 (quoting Green v. County School Board, 391 U.S. at
438). The district court also issued orders relating to faculty and staff, Morgan v. Kerrigan, 388 F.
Supp. 581 (D. Mass. 1975), aff'd, 530 F.2d 431 (Ist Cir. 1976); facilities, Morgan v. McDonough,
689 F.2d 265 (1st cir. 1982); special education, school safety and security, student discipline, bilin-
gual education, vocational education, and student transportation, Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp.
214 (D. Mass. 1985).
83. Morgan v.McDonough, 554 F. Supp. 169 (D. Mass. 1982).
84. Id. at 171. While initially keeping the outstanding desegregation orders in effect, the court
established a new administrative mechanism that reduced the need for direct judicial supervision.
The court transferred to the Massachusetts Board of Education ("State Board") the primary respon-
sibility for monitoring defendants' compliance with the court's desegregation orders and for mediat-
ing disputes between the parties. The district court required the State Board to submit semi-annual
reports on defendants' efforts toward fulfilling their duty of remedying segregation. Morgan v.
Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 316 (1st Cir. 1987).
85. See Morgan v. Nucci, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. Aug. 8, 1985) (student transportation or-
der); Morgan v. Nucci, No. 72-911-G (D. Mass. May 17, 1985) (bilingual education, school safety
and security, and student discipline orders); Morgan v. Walsh-Tomasini, No. 72-91 1-G (D. Mass.
Oct. 31, 1984) (special education and institutional pairing orders). For an injunctive order not elimi-
nated, see Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214 (D. Mass. 1985).
86. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 316. Besides student assignments, other areas in which the
district court retained control included vocational and occupational education, school facilities, staff
desegregation, and parent and student organizations. Id.
The district court noted that "while significant progress has been made in these areas, the State
Board reports show that each entails some unfinished planning, implementation or monitoring."
Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. at 218. The court signalled its lessened involvement, however, by
formally removing the Boston case from its active docket. Id. at 219.
87. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 317. The final order required that the schools:
(a) shall compose enrollments at each school so that its racial/ethnic proportions shall be
consistent with current guidelines which shall be derived, with respect to city-wide magnet
schools and programs, from the citywide public school population and, with respect to
district schools, from the public school population of their current districts or consolida-
tions thereof;...
https://openscholarship.wustl.edu/law_lawreview/vol66/iss3/7
1988] THE UNITARINESS DILEMMA
formula was inappropriate.88 The board asserted that, by 1985, it had
substantially complied with all the court's remedial assignment orders.8 9
As for student assignments, the school board contended that compliance
was at the highest practicable level. 90
Addressing the school board's contention of maximum practicable
compliance, the First Circuit noted that the board had not achieved
unitariness in all aspects of the Boston school system.91 The First Circuit
held, however, that a failure to achieve unitariness in other areas did not
justify the district court's continued imposition of a specific student as-
signment plan.92 The First Circuit opined that the "primary inquiry is
... whether unitariness has been reached in the area of student assign-
ments itself."93 The record suggested to the appeals court that the stu-
dent assignment process was unitary.94  However, the First Circuit
declined to make a final determination until the district court had a sec-
ond opportunity to consider this specific unitariness issue.95
B. The Test for Unitariness
Even though the First Circuit left the ultimate determination of
unitariness to the district court, it developed a tripartite test for deter-
(b) alternatively, may beginning with the 1986-87 school year or thereafter use a single,
city-wide guideline for assigning students ....
Morgan v. Nucci, 620 F. Supp. 214, 215-16 (D. Mass 1985). The circuit court further elaborated the
order:
Under either (a) or (b) assignment totals at a particular school may diverge from the target
percentages within a range determined by adding and subtracting 25 percent of the total
percentage. Thus, if the target percentage for a particular group is 48 percent, any assign-
ment between 36 and 60 percent (48 plus or minus 12) is acceptable.
Morgan v Nucci, 831 F.2d at 317 n.3 (citation deleted).
88. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 317. The school defendants also appeal from an unpublished
order of May 24, 1985, requiring schools in districts 4 and 5 to meet the district's racial mix within a
variance of ten percent. Id. at 317, n.3.
89. Id. at 317.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 318 (citing faculty and staff assignments as an example).
92. Id.
93. Id. (emphasis original).
94. Id.
95. Id. Conversely, in part III of the opinion, the court rejected the Boston Teachers Union's
appeal from a final order requiring the school board to follow hiring practices that would secure a
faculty and staff of not less than twenty-five percent black and ten percent other minority members.
This order represented a continuation of goals set in the mid-1970's. The First Circuit held that the
district court could continue this desegregation program because the goals of a unitary staff and
faculty had yet to be realized. Id at 328-29. The court also dismissed as moot the City of Boston's
appeal from the district court order relating to unified facilities. Id. at 332.
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mining whether Boston's student assignments had achieved unitary sta-
tus and instructed the district court to apply it. 96
1. One-Race or Racially Identifiable Schools
The First Circuit stated that an abundance of one-race or racially iden-
tifiable schools in a particular district may preclude a finding of unitari-
ness.97 To determine if Boston had an impermissible number of one-race
schools, the court first had to consider the percentage at which a school
becomes one-race.98 The court declined to specifically adopt either an 80
or 90 percent standard because under either figure, Boston had a permis-
sible number of one-race schools.99 The court suggested that further de-
segregation of Boston's one-race schools would be impracticable due to
"intractable demographic obstacles." 1" Therefore, the number of one-
race schools appeared to the court to be consistent with a finding of
unitariness. 01
2. Good Faith
The First Circuit also observed that a history of good faith operation
of the school system, in general, and implementation of assignment or-
ders, in particular, would support a finding of unitariness. 10 2 The court
included a good faith element because such a test would provide contin-
ued jurisdiction over school boards that have implemented neutral proce-
96. Id. at 318-23.
97. Id. at 319. The First Circuit also recognized, however, that "some small number of one-
race, or virtually one-race, schools within a district is not in and of itself the mark of a system that
still practices segregation by law." Id. (quoting Swann v. Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 26
(1971)).
98. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 319-20. The court noted that other courts had applied per-
centages ranging from 70-90 percent. Id. at 320. The court refused to use 70 or 75 percent as a
figure appropriate for Boston schools. The court demonstrated that a figure in this range would label
many Boston schools one-race even if their racial mix matched that of the court-established district
in which they operate. Id. at 320 n.7.
99. Id. at 320. Using a 90 percent figure, only one school, Cheverus Middle School, had a
racial majority of more than ninety percent. The school (91 percent white) is located in East Boston,
an area excluded from much of the district court's remedial plan due to its geographic isolation. Id.
Using an 80 percent figure, the number of one-race schools rose to thirteen. Eight of these schools
(80'percent or more black) are in the most heavily black sections of Boston. Four of these schools
(80 percent or more white) are located in East Boston. Id. All the schools, however, were in compli-
ance with the district court's desegregation orders. Id.
100. 831 F.2d at 320-21.
101. Id. at 320.
102. Id. at 321.
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dures but continue to exhibit "discriminatory animus" in
decisionmaking.1t 3 The presence of good faith reduces the possibility
that board compliance is but a "temporary constitutional ritual." 1"
In the Boston case, the First Circuit pointed to two factors demon-
strating the school board's good faith. First, the court stressed that the
last State Board report concluded that the school board had fully com-
plied with the student assignment orders. 10 Second, the court noted that
minorities had gained several positions of responsibility in the school sys-
tem, countering the possibility of intentional resegregation after termina-
tion of court supervision.10 6
3. Maximum Practicable Desegregation
Finally, the First Circuit emphasized that the ultimate goal of a deseg-
regation program is "maximum practicable desegregation," 10 7 a practi-
cal, not a theoretical standard. 08 According to the court, the district
court should not continue supervision merely because some further de-
gree of compliance with assignment orders is possible.109 As long as the
school board substantially complies with assignment orders, the court
should forego retaining jurisdiction over assignment practices.110
The First Circuit went on to consider actual enrollment in the Boston
school system."1 If actual enrollment figures are skewed so that there is
103. Id.
104. Id.
105. Id.
106. Id. The court also commented that:
[b]y 1982, personnel changes and improved attitudes led both the district court and this
court to comment on the responsible approach the school defendants were exhibiting to-
wards the running of the school system and the implementation of the district court's
orders... This was true on the date of the orders under review.
Id.
107. Id. at 322. "[Whether] public officials have satisfied their responsibility to eradicate segre-
gation and its vestiges must be based on conditions in the district, the accomplishments to date, and
the feasibility offurther measures." Id. (quoting Ross v. Houston Independent School District, 699
F.2d 218, 227 (5th Cir. 1983) (emphasis supplied)).
108. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d at 324.
109. Id.
110. Id. at 322.
111. Id. at 323. The court noted that actual enrollment may serve as a further check on the
effectiveness of the assignment reform. Id. Based on the February 1985 monitoring report, the State
Board found that only three of the fourteen high schools exhibited non-compliance, and none by
more than two percentage points. All of the high schools out of compliance had too few whites,
consistent with the State Board's explanation that enrollments may fail to fully reflect assignments
because of the shrinking white population. Only one high school, the isolated East Boston High, had
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a significant number of one-race schools, then the district court has a
right to question the effectiveness of the plan itself.112 Any divergence,
however, between assignments and actual enrollment caused solely by
"white flight" 113 should not be attributed to the school board. 14 The
First Circuit found "that the once segregated Boston schools achieved a
substantial degree of racial integration." '
III. APPLICATION OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT TEST
This Note examines the effectiveness of the First Circuit's test for
more than 34 percent white enrollment, while the remaining two had more than 25 percent white
enrollment. Id.
The State Board found that of the twenty-six middle schools, eleven had actual enrollments out of
compliance, three as to black, seven as to whites, and one as to other minorities. None of these
schools had too many whites. The State Board found that due to the special admission exams for
entry to the seventh grade at Boston Latin School and Latin Academy, compliance cannot be
achieved as to black enrollment. Id.
Finally, as for the elementary schools, the State Board found that 11 of 78 schools were out of
compliance. However, the degree of noncompliance was greater, ranging from a minimum of five
percent to a maximum of eighteen percent. Id. at 324. The First Circuit found that even though the
schools were not in literal compliance with the assignment orders, there was no evidence that this
non-compliance was caused by an "attempt to maintain enclaves of segregation." Id.
112. Id.
113. The problem of "white flight," whites leaving the city to avoid desegregation, is the greatest
threat to complete desegregation. A major problem in designing an effective desegregation remedy
is the extent to which the court can take into account the possibility of white flight in response to the
desegregation order. See generally Gewirtz, Remedies and Resistance, 92 YALE L.J. 585, 625-65
(1983) (discussing the white flight phenomenon and possible legal responses).
114. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 322-23 (1st Cir. 1987). As the court pointed out, "[w]hile
those charged with desegregation must not shrink from the threat of white flight, school officials who
have taken effective action have no affirmative fourteenth-amendment duty to respond to those who
vote with their feet." Id. at 323 (quoting Ross v. Houston Independent Schools, 699 F.2d 218, 225
(5th Cir. 1983)).
115. 831 F.2d at 323. See also supra note 111. Based on the State Board monitoring reports and
actual enrollment figures, the court vacated the final orders as to student assignments. Id. at 326.
The court also rejected three additional reasons the district court gave for maintaining jurisdiction.
First, the district court found that school defendants were responsible for the racial identifiability in
districts 4 and 5 by their failure to adopt "special desegregation measures." Id. at 325. The First
Circuit noted these plans were not fixed plans but recommendations intended to attract more white
students to these schools on a voluntary basis. Failure to implement these plans, the First Circuit
held, does not show bad faith. Id. Second, the First Circuit found that a failure to create a unified
facilities plan does not prohibit a finding of unitariness in student assignments. While poor upkeep
of schools may impede desegregation, the answer to that is better maintenance. The school defend-
ants were developing a plan for better maintenance. Id. at 325-26. Finally, the court rejected the
desirability of further monitoring as a basis for continued supervision over student assignments.
Either schools are unitary or not. This rationale does not demonstrate the need for a continued
injunction as to student assignments. Id. at 326.
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unitariness by applying it to two school systems with long histories of
desegregation litigation culminating with a reaffirmation of a previous
finding of unitary status. These are the Norfolk, Virginia and Oklahoma
City, Oklahoma systems.' 16
A. Norfolk, Virginia 117
Litigation to desegregate the Norfolk public school system began in
1956.'1 8 In 1970, the Fourth Circuit upheld the district court's finding of
deliberate segregation in the Norfolk public schools and ordered the dis-
trict court to make the system unitary." 9 The plan called for mandatory
busing. 2 The ultimate goal of the plan was to achieve a 70/30 ration of
black to white students in the public schools. 2 ' In 1975, the district
court found the system unitary and dismissed the case.'22
During the period from 1975 to 1980, the 70/30 ratio fell apart and the
Norfolk school system moved toward resegregation. 2 3 The resegrega-
116. This Note chose these school systems for two reasons. First, within the last two years the
courts of appeals in these two jurisdictions reached diametrically opposed views on the effects of a
finding of unitariness. See supra notes 33-67 and accompanying text. Second, the history of desegre-
gation efforts in both cities has been extensive and is well documented. See generally Note, The
Unitariness Finding and its Effect on Mandatory Desegregation Injunctions, 55 FORDHAM L. REV.
551, 567-73 (1987); Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE. W. REs. 41, 44-53
(1987).
117. For an excellent account of the history of school desegregation in Norfolk, Virginia, see
Note, The Unitary Finding and the Threat of School Resegregation: Riddick v. School Board, 65
N.C.L. REV. 618 (1987).
118. Adkins v. School Board of the City of Newport News, 148 F. Supp. 430 (E.D. Va.), aff'd,
246 F.2d 324 (4th Cir.), cert denied, 355 U.S. 855 (1957). Following intervention by other plaintiffs,
the case was renamed Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 349 F.2d 414 (4th Cir. 1965).
119. Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 434 F.2d 408, 410 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
399 U.S. 929 (1970). Following the Supreme Court's Swann decision, the Fourth Circuit again
remanded Brewer to the district court for implementation of a desegregation plan conforming with
Swann's expanded scope of remedies. Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 524
(4th Cir.), cert denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
120. Brewer v. School Board of the City of Norfolk, 456 F.2d 943, 945 (4th Cir.), cert. denied,
407 U.S. 933 (1972). In addition to mandatory busing, the district court utilized pairing and cluster-
ing of schools in Norfolk. Finally, the plan called for free busing for students. Riddick, 784 F.2d at
525.
121. 784 F.2d at 526. A school was considered segregated if its enrollment consisted of more
than seventy percent black students. Id.
122. 784 F.2d at 525. No appeal was taken from this order. However, from 1975 to 1983, the
board continued crosstown busing. Id.
123. In 1970, the population of Norfolk was 70 percent white and 28 percent black. During the
1969-70 school year, 57 percent of the public school students were white, while 43 percent were
black. Id.
By 1980, the general population in Norfolk had declined more than 11 percent to 61 percent white
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tion was caused by declines in student population, "white flight," and
less parental involvement in the schools.' 24  In 1983, the school board
proposed a plan to stabilize the system. 125 The plan eliminated cross-
town busing of elementary school children. 126 In its place the plan called
for single attendance zone schools.' 27 Students then were fed into eight
junior high schools each with maximum black/white ratios of 72/28 per-
cent and a minimum ratio of 56/44 percent. 128
In Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk,'29 plaintiffs asserted that
the 1983 plan was a deliberate attempt to resegregate the schools.' 30 The
district court 13' and the Fourth Circuit132 disagreed with the plaintiffs,
finding no discriminatory intent by the school board to reestablish a dual
system.
and 35 percent black. By the 1980-81 school year, enrollment had shrunk 37 percent. White enroll-
ment dropped 42 percent while black enrollment rose to 57 percent. Id. at 525. Due to the decline
in student enrollment, seventeen elementary schools were closed primarily in black neighborhoods.
Id. at 526.
124. 784 F.2d at 526. Gradually, the elementary schools were becoming resegregated. In 1977,
one school was over 70 percent black. By 1981, seven elementary schools were over 70 percent
black. In addition, parental involvement measured by PTA membership dropped from 15,000 par-
ents to 3,500. Id. at 526. The school board reasoned that increased parental involvement "was
essential to the well-being of the school system." Id. at 529.
125. Riddick, 784 F.2d at 526. In 1981, the school board appointed a committee to examine the
feasibility of reducing crosstown busing. The committee members visited other school systems to
study their desegregation programs. The committee appointed a task force to produce data for the
committee and hired expert consultants in their field. Id. One of these experts, Dr. Armor prepared
a report on the problems of continued integration of the schools. Armor found that mandatory
busing led to significant white flight and that if busing continued the Norfolk system would become
75 percent black. He urged the committee to eliminate busing. Id.
126. 784 F.2d at 526-27. Single attendance zone schools are more commonly known as neigh-
borhood schools.
127. Id. at 527. The single attendance zones were gerrymandered so as to achieve maximum
racial integration. Under the plan, twelve of Norfolk's thirty-six elementary schools would be 70
percent or more black compared to four under the busing plan. Of those twelve, ten would be 95
percent or more black. Six schools would become 70 percent or more white. Id.
128. 784 F.2d at 527. In addition, the plan contained a majority minority transfer option.
Under the option a student assigned to a school at which his race constitutes 70 percent or more of
the tupils can transfer to a school where his race is less than 50 percent of the pupils. The plan also
provided for free transportation of students exercising this option. The school board estimated that
10-15 percent of eligible students would take advantage of the transfer program. Five year projec-
tion showed that as many as 40 percent of the students might opt for the transfer. Id. The plan also
provided for multi-cultural programs to "expose students in racially isolated elementary schools to
students of other races." Id. Finally, the plan contained a parental involvement policy. Id.
129. 784 F.2d 521 (4th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
130. 784 F.2d at 525.
131. Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 627 F. Supp. 814 (E.D. Va. 1984).
132. 784 F.2d at 544.
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Had the district court applied the First Circuit's test of unitariness to
the Norfolk district in 1983, the date of the complaint, it would have
found that the indicia of unitariness were present.
L One Race Schools
Under the original Norfolk plan the goal was a maximum of 70/30
percent black/white ratio.' 33 The school board achieved this goal by
1975.134 However, had the school board failed to adopt the new plan in
1983, estimates show that, given white flight and demographic changes,
by 1987 75 percent of the students in Norfolk schools would have been
black. "'35 This would render the 70/30 ratio an impossibility. Under the
new plan, one-third of Norfolk elementary schools would be 70 percent
or more black. 136 To counterbalance this relatively high figure, all the
junior high schools would be fully integrated near the original goal of a
70/30 ratio. 3 7 As the Morgan court recognized, the percentage of stu-
dents making a school "one-race" varies according to demographic con-
ditions.'38 Furthermore, the fact that there are a few one-race schools
does not mean the system is dual.I39 However, because the First Circuit
failed to specify the threshold percentage making a school one-race or the
number of schools in a system making it dual, a reasonable application of
the first prong of Morgan is difficult.
2. Good Faith
While the evidence supporting prong one is mixed, the evidence sup-
porting prong two of the First Circuit test is strong. Adoption and im-
plementation of the plan in four years supports a finding of good faith by
the school board. Additionally, the 1983 plan furthered unitariness by
maintaining the junior high schools at or near the 70 percent goal."4
Furthermore, as in Boston, several black board members were elected to
the Norfolk board, lessening the chance of intentional resegregation.''
Finally, unlike Boston, the Norfolk school system had made great strides
133. See supra note 121 and accompanying text.
134. See supra note 122 and accompanying text.
135. See supra note 123 and accompanying text.
136. See supra note 127.
137. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
138. See supra note 98.
139. See supra notes 99-102 and accompanying text.
140. See supra note 128 and accompanying text.
141. Three of the seven Norfolk board members were black. In addition, one of the black mem-
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in the integration of faculty and staff.142 This combination of factors
makes the showing of good faith in Norfolk stronger than in Boston.
3. Maximum Practicable Desegregation
Similarly, the Norfolk school board appears to have attained the maxi-
mum practicable desegregation of its schools. Based on the large amount
of white flight and a drop in school-age population,143 the 70/30 ratio
would probably no longer serve as an effective device for attaining uni-
tary status. Under the 1983 plan, the board intended to maintain and
perhaps improve that racial balance.'"
B. Oklahoma City, Oklahoma 14 5
Desegregation of the Oklahoma City schools began in 1961.46 From
1961 to 1972, the parties to the litigation struggled though the task of
desegregating the public schools, each proffering different plans to ac-
complish that goal. 14 7 The district court finally ordered implementation
of the "Finger Plan" after finding that the school board thwarted earlier
desegregation efforts.14 In 1975 the school board moved to close the
bers voted for the 1983 plan. Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 526 n.4 (4th
Cir.), 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
142. 784 F.2d at 533. The district court previously found the school administration balanced
and the racial composition of the faculty mixed. Id.
143. See supra note 124 and accompanying text.
144. 784 F.2d at 525-28.
145. For a history of the Oklahoma City litigation from 1961 to 1972, see Dowell v. School
Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 219 F. Supp. 427 (W.D. Okla. 1963); Dowell v. School
Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, 430 F.2d 865 (10th Cir. 1970); Dowell v. School Board of
Education of the Oklahoma City Public Schools, 338 F. Supp. 1256 (W.D. Okla.), aff'd, 465 F.2d
1012 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 1051 (1972).
146. Dowell v. Board of Education of Oklahoma, 795 F.2d 1516, 1517 (10th Cir.), cert. denied,
479 U.S. 938 (1986).
147. 795 F.2d at 1517-18.
148. 338 F. Supp. at 1263. The Tenth Circuit described the Finger Plan as follows:
The plan restructured attendance zones for high schools and middle schools so that each
level enrolled black and white students. At the elementary level, all schools with a major-
ity of black pupils become fifth grade centers which provided enhanced curricula, All
elementary schools with a majority of white students were converted to serve grades one to
four. Generally, the white students continued to attend neighborhood schools while black
students in grade one through four were bused to classes. When white students reached
the fifth grade, they were bused to the fifth grade center, while black fifth graders attended
the centers in their neighborhoods. Schools which were located in integrated areas quali-
fied as "stand alone schools," and the students in grades one through five remained in their
own neighborhood.
795 F.2d at 1518.
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case, claiming that it had "eliminated all vestiges of state-imposed racial
discrimination in its school system." 149 In 1977 the district court
granted the motion to terminate active supervision."' In 1985, plaintiffs
sought to reopen the case, claiming the school board abandoned the Fin-
ger Plan and instituted a new "Student Reassignment Plan" that would
resegregate the schools.151 The district court denied this request and
found the new plan constitutional.152 The Circuit Court of Appeals re-
versed and remanded. 153
The First Circuit's unitariness test leads to mixed results when applied
to the Oklahoma City School system as it would be modified by its new
Student Reassignment Plan.
1. One-Race Schools
The one-race aspect of the First Circuit's tripartite test lends the least
support to a finding of unitariness under the new assignment plan.
Under the plan the percentage of one-race elementary schools would be
approximately 51 percent.154
2. Good Faith
Although the number of one-race schools would increase under the
plan, evidence of good faith in the implementation of the Finger Plan and
the newly devised plan is strong. The evidence shows that the school
149. Id. at 1518.
150. Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City Public Schools, No. CIV-9452, slip. op. (W.D.
Okla. Jan. 18, 1977).
151. 606 F. Supp. at 1548. The new Student Reassignment Plan ended compulsory busing of
black students in grades one through four. In its place, the plan reinstated neighborhood elementary
schools for those grades. Free transportation was provided for children in the racial majority who
choose to transfer to a school in which they were a minority. Racial balance in the fifth grade
centers, middle schools, and high schools would be maintained by mandatory busing. Id. at 1551-53.
Under this plan thirty-three of the system's sixty-four elementary schools would have one-race en-
rollments of 90 percent or more. 795 F.2d at 1518.
152. 606 F. Supp. at 1557. The district court noted that the purposes of the new plan were to
increase parental involvement, provide students with a greater opportunity to participate in extra-
curricular activities, and minimize the busing of small children. Id. at 1553. In addition, the plan
assured that the curriculum, student/teacher ratios, facilities, equipment, supplies, and textbooks
would be the same in all schools. Id. Furthermore, the plan called for the appointment of an equity
officer to monitor all schools and ensure equality of facilities, equipment, supplies, books, and teach-
ers. An equity committee would assist the equity officer and recommend ways to integrate students
at any racially identifiable schools. Id.
153. Dowell v. Board of Education, 795 F.2d 1516, 1523 (10th Cir.), cert. denied, 479 U.S. 938
(1986). See also supra notes 44-47, 63-66 and accompanying text.
154. See supra note 151.
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board implemented and properly operated the Finger Plan which led to a
finding of unitariness on January 18, 1977.155 In addition, the school
board adopted the new plan to improve parental involvement in the
schools and minimize elementary school busing. 156 Furthermore, the
school board held public hearings at which any person could express his
views.157 The plan called for an equity officer to monitor all schools and
insure the equality of facilities, equipment, supplies, books, and instruc-
tors. An equity committee would assist the equity officer and recom-
mend ways to integrate schools that became racially identifiable. 158 And
finally, similar to the Norfolk experience, there was great improvement
in black participation in the administration, faculty, and staff of the
school system. 159
3. Maximum Practicable Desegregation
Two factors support a finding of maximum practicable desegregation
in the Oklahoma City schools. First, population changes dramatically
reduced the number of white students in the school system since imple-
mentation of the Finger Plan. Conversely, the percentage of blacks in
the school population rose dramatically, making further desegregation
impracticable."1°  Second, under the Finger Plan elementary schools
achieved what the district court called "stand alone" status. 61 The
court confers this status when the school's neighborhood has achieved a
racial balance through natural integration.162 Once achieved, students
previously bused to the school must be redirected to schools that have
155. See supra note 150.
156. See supra note 152.
157. Dowell v. School Board of Oklahoma City, 606 F. Supp. 1548, 1552 (W.D. Okla. 1985).
158. See supra note 152.
159. 606 F. Supp. at 1553. The racial composition of the faculty and staff as of 1985 was as
follows:
Teachers 30.4% black
Principles 28.4% black
Other Administrators 35.5% black
Coaches 45.6% black
Counselors 41.3% black
Special Ed. Teachers 30.2% black
Support Personnel 45.9% black
Id. In addition, the school board had implemented an affirmative action plan. Id.
160. In 1971, the student population was 23 percent black and 77 percent white. By 1985, how-
ever, the student population was 38 percent black but only 50 percent white (the balance consisting
of non-black minorities). 606 F. Supp. at 1553.
161. Id. at 1552.
162. Id. at 1551.
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not yet achieved a racial balance. Thus, under the Finger Plan, the dis-
trict court would have to bus young black children further north, west,
or south to all-wite schools.163 According to the district court, this in-
creased burden on young children is highly impracticable."' Under the
new Student Reassignment Plan, the burden of busing would be lessened
and the board could achieve both unitariness and increased parental
involvement. 65
IV. CRITIQUE OF THE FIRST CIRCUIT'S TEST
Part III of this Note demonstrated the application of the First Cir-
cuit's test. Part IV, A identifies the parts of the First Circuit's test that
hamper its effectiveness. Section B proposes modifications of the First
Circuit's test creating a method of analysis that ensures a system is
unitary.
A. Criticisms
There are several flaws in the First Circuit's test. The first and perhaps
greatest flaw is the amount of weight given to the school board's good
faith.1 66 The First Circuit did not specify whether the test of good faith
should be objective or subjective. 167 Assuming the inquiry is subjective,
the question remains whether a court can believe that a school board
with a history of segregationist practices has suddenly become enlight-
163. Id. at 1552.
164. Id.
165. Id. at 1554. A useful critique of the Fourth and Tenth Circuit opinions is contained in
Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools, 37 CASE W. RES. 41 (1987). The author states in
pertinent part:
Both opinions are inadequate guides for future courts and parties in the post-unitary pe-
riod. On the one hand, Riddick places too severe a burden on plaintiffs and simply gives
the defendant school board too much room to maneuver once a public school system has
been declared unitary. If the test in Riddick is followed, courts may hesitate to make
findings of unitariness for fear that the school system will quickly revert to a dual system
rendering the efforts of past decades futile. On the other hand, the court in Dowell reaches
the correct result by analyzing the parties' burdens of proof through the use of language
normally associated with permanent injunctions. Unfortunately, the court's reasoning is
strained to the point of being disingenuous, thus Dowell, too, is of little help to courts and
parties dealing with this problem in the future.
Id. at 43.
166. See supra notes 101-05 and accompanying text.
167. An objective good faith test looks at the school board's efforts through the reasonable per-
son's eyes. A subjective test, on the other hand, determines good faith from the perspective of the
school board (i.e., their motivations for a particular action).
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ened and intends to maintain a unitary system. 168 The decision to adopt
a desegregation plan comes from a district court, not the school board.
Prompt implementation of a plan and cooperation with the district court
could be explained as a ploy by the school board to return the school
system to its control.1 69 It would seem mere cooperation cannot prove a
change of heart in people who operated a segregated system.170
If, on the other hand, the First Circuit intended an objective test for
good faith, other problems arise. Even if there has been improvement in
the area of minority faculty, staff and administrative personnel, the
school board might be using these improvements to hide true animus
toward establishing a unitary system. 171 Conversely, the Boston school
board could not have acted in good faith when it failed to make improve-
ments in areas other than student assignments.1 72
Similarly, the bare fact that there were black decision-makers in Bos-
ton, Norfolk, and Oklahoma City fails to prove that the respective school
boards acted in good faith. In all three cases the black members consti-
tuted a minority of the school board.1 73 Even assuming the black mem-
bers could muster enough support to pass a proposal, there is no
assurance that black members would act in the best interest of black stu-
dents. Perhaps feeling the pressure from those opposed to busing and
other desegregation policies, black members would agree to curb desegre-
168. For example, the district court in the Oklahoma City case found that, prior to the "Finger
Plan," the school board thwarted desegregation orders. Dowell v. Board of Education, 795 F.2d
1516, 1518 (10th Cir.), 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
169. It could reasonably be assumed that a school board realizes the sooner it implements the
court order, the sooner the school board regains control over the system. See United States v. Over-
ton, 834 F.2d 1171, 1175 (1987).
170. In addition, it seems strange that a school board that for years operated a dual system and
fought the court ordered desegregation can cure those years of consitutional violations with adher-
ence to a court-ordered plan. This ignores the fact that years of segregation have produced certain
vestiges such as segregated housing and poor maintenance of black schools. Removal of these ves-
tiges will take longer than full implementation of a school desegregation order. Until those vestiges
are removed, however, the court should maintain control over the school system. See Note, Unitary
Schools and Underlying Vestiges of State-Imposed Segregation, 87 COLUM. L. REv. 794, 799-805
(1987).
171. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987).
172. In Green v. County School Board, the Supreme Court identified segregation of students,
faculty, staff, transportation, extracurricular activities, and facilities as indicia of a dual system. 391
U.S. 430, 435 (1968). If this is true, then the Boston school system failed to fully exhibit what the
Court has called "among the most important indicia of a segregated system." Swann v. Charlotte-
Mecklenburg Board of Education, 402 U.S. 1, 18 (1971).
173. For example, on the Norfolk board only three of the seven board members were black. See
supra note 141.
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gation plans, preserving their jobs.174
More importantly, terminating court supervision after a school board's
first "successful" attempt at remedying purposeful discrimination is
wrong. The measure of success must be the achievement of results,'75
not simply good faith.
The second flaw in the First Circuit's approach is found in the one-
race school element. By failing to specify the percentage of minority stu-
dents in a school that would make the school "one-race," the First Cir-
cuit gives district courts carte blanche to decide the appropriate
percentage. A judge who favors returning the school system to the board
might fix the percentage at an unusually high level. Inflating the percent-
age would lead to an exaggerated number of unitary schools in a system,
depriving the plaintiffs of an effective remedy.
A third flaw in the First Circuit's analysis involves the element of max-
imum practicable desegregation. How should a district court determine
the point at which further desegregation efforts are impracticable? Reli-
ance on demographics gives the school board an excuse to abandon de-
segregation orders because of white flight.176 Furthermore, can a court
really believe a school board that says it has achieved maximum practica-
ble desegregation? From whose standpoint does the court determine
practicability? The school board's? The court's? The plaintiff'? The
First Circuit's opinion leaves these questions unanswered.
The final flaw of the First Circuit's approach to unitariness is that the
court ignores the issue of how a finding of unitariness will affect the
plaintiff's remedial rights. 177 The court failed to consider the effect of
unitary status on the district court's jurisdiction, or the future plaintiff's
burden of proof.
B. Modification of the First Circuit's Test
Despite the flaws in the First Circuit's analysis, the test could be modi-
fied to produce a test that considers both the plaintiff's remedial rights
and the school board's desire to regain local autonomy.
178
174. For example, in Norfolk two of the board members voting in favor of the new plan were
black. See supra note 141.
175. Green, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (any desegregation plan must "realistically... work now") (em-
phasis in original).
176. See supra note 114 and accompanying text.
177. See supra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
178. See Milliken v. Bradley, 433 U.S. 267, 280-81 (1977) (when drafting a desegregation rem-
1988]
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First, this modified test would require that the desegregation plan
worked effectively. 179 To make this determination the court could prop-
erly take into account the number of one-race schools remaining after
completion of the plan.18 Until the number of one-race schools reached
an acceptable level, the court would retain jurisdiction to modify the plan
as necessary.18
Second, in determining the acceptable number of one-race schools, the
district court should specify what percentage of students makes a school
one-race.182 Absent special circumstances, 183 the court should continue
to use that percentage until the system is declared unitary.
Third, the district court should set a target number for determining
the acceptable level of one-race schools in a unitary system.' 84 For a
system to be declared unitary the school board must come within 5 per-
cent of that goal.' 85 Failure to do so would require continued district
court supervision.
Fourth, good faith, both subjective and objective,' 86 would play a mi-
edy, the district court should consider not only the restorative effect of the remedy, but also the local
officials' interest in autonomy over local affairs); Swam v. Charlotte-Mecklenburg Board of Educa-
tion, 402 U.S. 1, 16 (1971) (the trial court's "task is to correct, by a balancing of the individual and
collective interests, the condition that offends the Constitution").
179. See supra text accompanying note 17.
180. Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 319 (10th Cir. 1987).
181. Most courts define one-race schools as having 70 percent or more students of one race. See,
eg., Riddick v. School Board of City of Norfolk, 784 F.2d 521, 526 (4th Cir.), 479 U.S. 938 (1986).
This figure should be the benchmark in any desegregation order unless a determination is made at
the time of implementation that a 70 percent goal would be impossible. The burden would fall on
the school board to prove that the 70 percent goal is impossible. Cf. Brown v. Board of Education
(Brown I1), 349 U.S. 294, 300-01 (1955) (placing on the school board the burden ofjustifying addi-
tional implementation time).
182. The court's determination would be based on all available demographic information.
183. For example, unexpected "white flight" might require reassessment of the threshold per-
centage. See supra note 98.
184. In this regard, the First Circuit correctly found that the goal of a desegregation order is
maximum practicable desegregation. See supra note 107 and accompanying text. The court must set
a realistic target and recognize the limits of possible desegregation.
185. Five percent provides a reasonable amount of leeway for the possibility of white flight.
Anything above five percent shows that the plan has failed to "realistically work now." See Green v.
County School Board, 391 U.S. 430, 439 (1968). Absent compliance the board could seek modifica-
tion of the order to take into account white flight. However, the board would have the burden of
proving that the impermissible number of one-race schools was caused by white flight. Moreover,
the court cannot abolish any remedial measures simply because of white flight. To do so would give
private biases constitutional protection. The Supreme Court has refused to grant such protection to
private biases in a different context. See Palmer v. Sidoti, 466 U.S. 432, 433 (1984) (invalidating
child custody awarded to a father merely because his ex-wife lived with a black man).
186. See supra notes 102-06 and accompanying text.
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nor role in determining unitariness. Good faith should never be the de-
ciding factor in determining that a system is unitary. 8 On the other
hand, the presence of bad faith, subjective or objective, would be a reason
for denying unitary status.1 8
Finally, even if the school board has met all of the above factors, the
court, as Professor Gewirtz suggested, should delay granting unitary sta-
tus for at least one generation.' 89 This assures that the remedy is not
merely temporary.190 In addition, requiring the court to wait a genera-
tion until handing the system back to the school board will assure that
likely none of the original board members who perpetuated segregation is
still in power. Perhaps new board members will adopt a more enlight-
ened policy than their predecessors and will not need judicial supervi-
sion. Most likely, these new members will have far more healthy and
productive views on the issue of a unitary school system.191
Under the proposed test, none of the three school systems would sat-
187. See supra notes 166-75 and accompanying text.
188. See Morgan v. Nucci, 831 F.2d 313, 321 (1st Cir. 1987) ("where a court has reason to
believe that a discrimination animus still taints local decisionmaking, it may be appropriate for the
court to retain jurisdiction for some period after neutral procedures have been implemented"). A
finding of bad faith is more consistent with the historical orientation of court-desegregated school
boards. Thus it is entitled to greater weight than a finding of good faith. See supra notes 166-72 and
accompanying text.
189. Gewirtz, supra note 20 at 789-98. As Professor Gewirtz has noted:
The effects of a violation are not erased the moment integration is achieved. One goal of a
desegregation remedy, for example, is to eliminate the racial identifiability of schools. That
goal, if taken seriously, cannot be achieved by producing an integrated student body in the
schools for a day, or even a year. A period of sustained compliance, perhaps an entire
generation, is needed for public perceptions about the racial character of the schools to be
transformed. Or to take another example: as the courts have repeatedly recognized, long-
standing de jure segregation has affected school site locations and residential patterns.
Desegregation, presumably, is not accomplished until these effects of the violation are re-
versed or no longer have any segregative effect on schools in the district. But this cannot
happen overnight. The remedy must be in place for a significant period of time-until, for
example, school locations and residential patterns have evolved so that a school board
decision to return to a neighborhood assignment system, or to eliminate the magnet schools
from a choice system, would not perpetuate effects of prior segregative actions.
Id. at 792-95. A generation is usually taken to be thirty-three years. WEBSTER's NEW INTERNA-
TIONAL DICTIONARY (unabridged) 1044 (2d. ed. 1959).
190. Gewirtz, supra note 20, at 795.
191. A more drastic proposal can be found in Terez, Protecting the Remedy of Unitary Schools,
37 CASE. W. REs. 41, 60-65 (1986). The author suggests that once a system is declared unitary the
district court enter a permanent injunction preventing any change in the court-made remedy. This
proposal is faulty because it fails to take into account the school board's interest in regaining control
over its system. See supra note 52. Under the test provided by this Note, the school board will one
day regain its control. The delay, however, is justified because it assures an effective remedy.
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isfy the final requirement.1 92 This would give both the courts and the
school boards more time to insure that the plans actually work and are
not merely token gestures to appease the courts and minorities.
V. CONCLUSION
The issue of whether a school system is unitary will continue to be a
troubling issue for district courts. Their task is not made easier by the
lack of guidance from the Supreme Court. This Note provides a possible
test that district courts could use in their determination. Ultimately, the
Supreme Court must stop avoiding the issue and hand down guidelines.
Too much is at stake for the school board, minorities, and parents for the
Supreme Court to stand on the sideline and let the lower courts decide on
an ad hoc basis193 if a system is unitary. The Supreme Court created this
problem in Swann'94 and Pasadena 195 with its promise to return the
school system to the board once it was unitary. Now the Court must
create a solution.
Seth Ptasiewicz
192. Under Professor Gewirtz's test the school board regains control thirty-three years after it is
declared unitary. See supra note 185.
193. See supra notes 33-67 and accompanying text.
194. See supra notes 27-32 and accompanying text.
195. See supra notes 33-40 and accompanying text.
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